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In early December, President Trump brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This dichotomy exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and conflict resolution—even as this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This pivot is consequential, but observers note it is premature to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Friction

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Conditional Involvement

A comparable tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.